S 156(5) of the Constitution. 10 The fact that original legislative powers have been conferred on municipal councils by the Although the Constitution confers the authority on municipalities to pass laws in respect of the matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5, the same authority has also been conferred upon the national and provincial governments. Municipalities, therefore, share the power to pass legislation on the matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B with the national and provincial governments.
While municipalities share the power to pass legislation on the matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B with the national and provincial governments, it is important to note that they do not share the power to administer and implement these laws. This is because the power conferred upon the national and provincial governments to pass laws on Schedule 4B and 5B matters is limited by sections 155(6)(a) and 155(7) of the Constitution.
Section 155(6)(a) of the Constitution provides in this respect that In Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal, 11 the Constitutional Court held that an important consequence of section 155(7) of the Constitution is that neither the national nor the provincial spheres of government powers, functions, rights and duties that may be qualified or constrained by law and only to the extent that the Constitution permits" (para 60). For a detailed discussion of a municipality's original powers, see Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-5, 5-11 to 5-12. exercised by municipalities themselves.
The scope and ambit of a municipal council's original powers
The scope and ambit of the functional areas set out in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 have been considered by the Constitutional Court on a number of occasions.
14 One of the most important of these judgments is Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill.
15
In this case the Constitutional Court held that that the scope and ambit of the matters set out in Schedule 4 and Schedule 5 of the Constitution must be interpreted in the light of the model of government adopted by the Constitution and the manner in which the Constitution allocates power to the different spheres of government.
In relation to the model of government adopted by the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has also held that the Constitution:
(a) distributes authority amongst the national, provincial and local spheres of government;
(b) provides that each sphere has the autonomy to exercise its powers and perform its functions within the parameters of its defined space;
(c) imposes a duty on each sphere not to assume any power or function except those conferred on it in terms of the Constitution; and (d) confers extensive powers on parliament including the power to pass legislation on "any matter", excluding only those matters that fall within the functional areas of exclusive provincial competence set out in Schedule 5.
16
Two important consequences flow from this model:
First, although they may appear to overlap, the functional areas of concurrent national and provincial competence listed in Schedule 4 must be interpreted as being distinct from and excluding the functional areas of exclusive provincial competence In this case the High Court held that a municipality's exclusive powers should be interpreted as applying primarily to matters which may appropriately be regulated intra-municipally, as opposed to intra-provincially. This means that where a matter requires regulation inter-municipally, rather than intra-municipally, the national and provincial governments have been given the power to do so, either concurrently or exclusively.
In arriving at this conclusion, the High Court relied heavily on the judgment in the Liquor Bill case even though that case dealt with the distribution of legislative powers between the national and provincial spheres of government, rather than the distribution of executive powers between the provincial and local spheres of government.
The second principle to which I wish to draw attention concerns the municipality's exclusive powers, which should be interpreted as applying primarily to matters which may appropriately be regulated intra-municipally, as opposed to intra-provincially.
In the interests of another province or the country as a whole. From s 146 it is evident that national legislation within the concurrent terrain of Schedule 4 that applies uniformly to the country takes precedence over the provincial powers and circumstances contemplated in s 44(2)...
22
From this dictum it is evident that, where a matter requires regulation interprovincially as opposed to intra-provincially, the Constitution ensures that national government is accorded the necessary power, either exclusively or concurrently under Schedule 4 or through the powers of intervention accorded to it by section 44(2). It appears that this principle must likewise apply to the proposition that has been outlined with regard to intra-municipal, as opposed to inter-municipal regulation.
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Apart from the principles set out in the Liquor Bill case, the Constitutional Court has also held that where two or more matters in the same Schedule appear to overlap with each other they should be interpreted in a "bottom-up" manner. 24 A bottom-up method of interpretation is one in which the more specific matter is defined first and all residual areas are left for the much broader matter. In the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, for example, one of the key questions the Constitutional Court had to answer was whether the power to approve applications for the rezoning of land and establishment of townships fell into the broad matter of "urban and rural development", which is listed in Schedule 4A, or into the specific matter of "municipal planning", which is listed in Schedule 4B. In accordance with the bottom-up method of interpretation, the Constitutional Court began its analysis, not with an examination of the scope and ambit of the broad matter of "urban and rural development", but rather with an examination of the scope and ambit of the specific matter of "municipal planning".
Insofar as the scope and ambit of "municipal planning" was concerned, the Constitutional Court began by explaining that although the term is not defined in the Constitution it has a particular and well-known meaning, which includes the zoning of land and the establishment of townships.
27
In addition, the Constitutional Court explained further that there is nothing in the Constitution which indicated that the term "municipal planning" should be given a meaning which is different from its common meaning. 28 The power to approve applications for the rezoning of land and the establishment of a township did, therefore, fall into the area of "municipal planning" listed in Schedule 4B.
29
After coming to this conclusion, the Constitutional Court turned to consider whether the same powers also fell into the broad matter of "urban and rural development".
The Court held that they did not. In arriving at this conclusion, the Constitutional Court began by explaining that the term "urban and rural development" could not be interpreted in a way that included the power to approve applications for the rezoning of land and the establishment of townships. This is because, the Constitutional Court An important consequence of this approach, the Court went on to hold, was that the term "urban and rural development" should be interpreted narrowly so that each sphere of government could exercise its powers without interference by another sphere of government.
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Having found that the term "urban and rural development" was not broad enough to include the powers that form a part of "municipal planning", the Constitutional Court then concluded, it was not necessary to go any further and define exactly what the scope of the functional area of "urban and rural development" was. "The construction that was adopted by the court below ... and that was advanced before us by counsel for the respondents, all proceed by inferential reasoning from the proposition that the functions with which we are now concerned are embraced by the concept of 'development' (a functional area that falls within the concurrent legislative authority of national and provincial government) and thus, by inference, fall to be excluded from the functional area 'municipal planning'. That line of reasoning seems to me to approach the matter the wrong way around. It is to be expected that the powers that are vested in government at national level will be described in the broadest of terms, that the powers that are vested in provincial government will be expressed in narrower terms, and that the powers that are vested in municipalities will be expressed in the narrowest terms of all. To reason inferentially with the broader expression as a starting point is bound to denude the narrower expression of any meaning and by so doing to invert the clear constitutional intention of devolving powers on local government".
In the same case, the Constitutional Court also held that not only must the functional areas listed in Schedule 4 be interpreted as being distinct from the functional areas listed in Schedule 5, but the functional areas within each Schedule must also be interpreted as being distinct from one another. "Urban and rural development", therefore, must be given a different content from "municipal planning". In this respect, the Constitutional Court stated that:
It is, however, true that the functional areas allocated to the various spheres of government are not contained in hermetically sealed compartments. But that notwithstanding, they remain distinct from one another. This is the position, even in respect of functional areas that share the same wording, like roads, planning, sport and others. The distinctiveness lies in the level at which a particular power is exercised. For example, the provinces exercise powers relating to 'provincial roads', whereas municipalities have authority over 'municipal roads'. The prefix attached to each functional area identifies the sphere to which it belongs and distinguishes it from the functional areas allocated to the other spheres. In the example just given, the functional area of 'provincial roads' does not include 'municipal roads'. In the same vein, 'provincial planning' and 'regional planning and development' do not include 'municipal planning'. The constitutional scheme propels one ineluctably to the conclusion that, barring functional areas of concurrent competence, each sphere of government is allocated separate and distinct powers which it alone is entitled to exercise. any legislative body in another sphere of government. In addition, they must also be read together with section 104(1)(c) of the Constitution, which provides that a provincial legislature may assign any of its legislative powers to a municipal council in that province.
The National Assembly's authority to assign any of its legislative powers to the provincial sphere of government was considered by the Constitutional Court in its judgment in Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government. 35 One of the issues the Constitutional Court had to decide in this case was whether the National Assembly could assign a matter that falls outside of Schedules 4 and 5 to the provinces impliedly rather than expressly. The
Constitutional Court held that it could not; instead, it had to assign these matters expressly.
The Constitutional Court based its decision on the following grounds:
First, that section 104(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution states that a provincial legislature has the authority to pass legislation on any matter outside Schedule 4 and 5 that has been "expressly" assigned to it by national legislation. 36 Second, that the word "expressly" should not be interpreted broadly to include the word "impliedly". This is because the constitutional scheme shows that the legislative authority of the provinces must be clearly identifiable and that the word "expressly" must be given a meaning that is consistent with this scheme.
37
Third, that the principle of the rule of law provides that when Parliament assigns powers to the provinces it must do so in a manner that creates certainty about the The public should be left with no doubt about which sphere of government has legislative competence with regard to the matter concerned. This is to preclude disputes. In order to reduce the amount of water lost through leakage and to increase the rate of payment, the City decided to abandon the system of deemed consumption flat rate charges and replace it with a free basic supply of six kilolitres per household per month and a pre-paid meter system. The applicants, who were residents of Phiri, then applied for an order declaring the City's decision to be unconstitutional and invalid. They based their application on a number of grounds. One of these was that the decision to install pre-paid meters was not authorised by the law.
In response the City argued that the installation of the pre-paid meters was the power to install pre-paid meters was reasonably incidental to the effective performance of the functions of a municipality. This was because, the Court held further, the power to install pre-paid meters was one which was reasonably incidental to providing services to citizens in a sustainable manner that permitted cost recovery. Given that the power to install pre-paid meters was reasonably incidental to the effect performance of its functions, the Court held further, section 3(2)(c) of the By-laws should be interpreted in a manner that conferred this power on the City.
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Although the issue in this case was not whether the municipal council had the power to pass a law dealing with pre-paid meters, but rather whether the municipal council had in fact passed such a law, the judgment can be interpreted as saying that while that specifically apply to them in their IDPs, 60 and demonstrate in the IDP how the national biodiversity framework and any applicable bioregional plan may be implemented in their areas of jurisdiction.
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After setting out these principles, the High Court turned to apply them to the facts.
In this respect it found that municipalities are authorised to legislate in respect of environmental matters to protect the environment at the local level and, 
Critical comment
Out of the three categories of legislative powers that municipal councils may enjoy, the High Court based its decision on the first two, namely the original legislative powers and the assigned legislative powers. For this reason, it is not necessary to say anything more about the third category of legislative power.
64
Insofar as the first and second categories are concerned, the High Court relied primarily on the first category when it held that the functional area of "municipal planning" encompasses "environmental matters", and only as an alternative on the second ground, when it held that legislative and executive authority over environmental matters as a part of municipal planning has been assigned by national and provincial legislation to municipalities.
Given that the Constitution allows Parliament to assign matters to the municipal councils much more easily than it allows Parliament to assign matters to the provincial legislatures, the judgment appears to be correct in holding that national and provincial legislation has implicitly assigned legislative authority over environment matters as a part of municipal planning to municipalities.
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Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 para 40.
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Given that the purpose of the incidental power is not to confer new functional areas on municipalities, but rather to confer the power on them to adopt measures that will enhance the effective administration of the functional areas over which they already have authority, it might be possible to argue that those parts of the D-MOSS that make provision for environmental authorisations do fall into the incidental powers of the eThekwini Municipality. It is not clear, however, that those parts of the D-MOSS that deal with the protection of biodiversity do. This is because they appear to deal with matters that fall into the functional area of the "environment".
The environmental matters explicitly allocated to the local sphere of government in Schedules 4B
and 5B of the Constitution include the following: air pollution; storm water management systems in built-up areas; water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic waste water and sewage disposal systems; beaches and amusement facilities; cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals; noise pollution; refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal the overlap. In other words, this does not give a municipal council the power to pass legislation that deals predominantly with the "environment" rather than with "municipal planning". In the case at hand it is difficult to know whether the Resolution introducing the D-MOSS system deals predominantly with the "environment" or with "municipal planning". As pointed out above, this is because the High Court did not clearly identify the subject-matter of the Resolution.
Third, that including "environmental matters at the local level" in the functional area While the functional area of "municipal planning" cannot simply encompass the broad subject-matter of "environment matters at the local level" for the reasons set out above, this does not mean that the functional area of "municipal planning" does not include certain specific environmental matters at the local level. Unfortunately, it is difficult to know which sorts of specific environmental matters at the local level should be included in the functional area of "municipal planning". This is because the High Court found that the substance of the resolution amending the town planning scheme to introduce the D-MOSS was simply the "environment", without first examining the resolution in the light of the factors that have been identified by the Constitutional Court on several occasions.
In the DVB Behuising case, for example, the Constitutional Court held that when it comes to determining whether or not legislation falls into a particular legislature's field of competence, a court first has to determine "the subject-matter or the substance of the legislation, its essence, or true purpose and effect, that is what the
[legislation] is about". In other words, the court has to look beyond the legislation's character or form and identify its true purpose and effect.
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The reason a court must look beyond the legislation's character or form and identify its true purpose and effect, the Constitutional Court held further, is because the purpose and effect may show that although the legislation purports to deal with a matter that falls within a legislature's field of competence, its true purpose and effect may be to achieve a different goal, one which falls outside the legislatures field of competence.
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In addition, the Constitutional Court also held that, when a court seeks to determine the subject-matter or substance of the legislation in question, it should take the preamble to the legislation and its legislative history into account. This is because they serve to illuminate the legislation's substance. "They place [the legislation] in context, provide an explanation for its provisions and articulate the policy behind them." 69 In the same judgment, the Constitutional Court went on to warn that it may not be possible to subject a particular piece of legislation to a uniform analysis directed at yielding a single characterisation of what its purpose might be. A single statute might have more than one purpose. Different parts of that statute may thus require different assessments in regard to the disputed question of legislative competence.
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If the High Court had followed the procedure set out above more closely, we would undoubtedly have a much better sense of whether or not the specific environmental matters dealt with by the D-MOSS Amendments fell into the functional area of "municipal planning" and, consequently, of the sorts of specific environmental matters at the local level that may or may not be included in "municipal planning".
Conclusion
While the judgment in Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality has correctly confirmed that municipal councils have the original authority to pass legislation dealing with environmental matters as a part of their power to pass legislation dealing with municipal planning, it has not set out the scope and ambit of this power as clearly as it could have. Given, however, that similar schemes will in all likelihood be implemented in other municipalities in the future, it seems inevitable that the issues raised in Le Sueur will be the subject of further litigation. This will contribute to the development of our nascent jurisprudence in this complex area of the law. 
